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NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE

C O M M E N T A R Y
Negotiating
Difference
by Lawrence Rosen
Americans have always been deeply
ambivalent about their native population.
In the 16th and 17th centuries, drawings
commonly showed Native Americans
dressed in toga-like garments and arrayed
in forums reminiscent of Roman senators.
At the same time, biblical passages were
cited, such as that inscribed from the Book
of Acts on the seal of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, suggesting that the natives
were pleading for the word of God to be
brought across the seas for their enlightenment. Later, Andrew Jackson could
ignore the Supreme Court in removing
the Cherokee and others to the West.
However, he also had to ignore petitions
by a huge proportion of Americans who
opposed his action. Notwithstanding
bitter Indian wars in the Great Plains,
the Supreme Court at the same time
recognized the right of an Indian to be
regarded as a “person” before the law. In
modern times, whites who would never
dream of adopting a black infant readily
seek to welcome an Indian child into
their family, and yet seek to question the
right of Indian tribes to vote in state elections despite their immunity from state
taxation. They will comment on the
shameful treatment of Indians in the past,
yet react, sometimes with violence, when
Indians assert their right to fish according
to 19th century treaties, or claim to be
honoring Indians when they refuse to
recognize the insult of using derogatory
terms about Indians for their favorite
athletic team. In every instance, the deep-

seated ambivalence toward native peoples
reveals itself anew.
To Americans of many eras, this
ambivalence has been of a piece with the
anomalous status of the tribes in our legal
and political system. Indians, quite simply,
stick in the throat of the American body
politic: Unable to absorb them or expel
them, white America keeps trying to
“solve the Indian problem” with one allembracing policy after another. Like stratigraphic layers, however, each of these
policies, once laid down, is never eradicated, each new approach being simply
piled on top of its predecessors with little
regard for the inconsistencies thereby
created. In the 18th century, Jefferson’s
hope was that Indians would constitute
an indigenous American yeomanry—
perfectly adapted, with the right material
and spiritual tools, to settle into agricultural pursuits and civilized perfection.
However, federal policy at that time
sought to create a barrier between the
Indians and the whites in order to reduce
friction between the two populations and
allow Indians time to accommodate themselves to white ways. The ever-changing
“Indian Barrier” was only the first of
many failures at a comprehensive
approach. As Brimley described in his
earlier Maine Policy Review article (Vol.
13.1, 2004), in the 1830s Chief Justice
John Marshall sought to extend the
overall power of the federal government
at the expense of the states by precluding
states from any role in Indian affairs. He
thereby set the tone for American ambivalence. In letting the central government
claim power through discovery or
conquest or the commerce clause of the
Constitution, he simultaneously told the
government that they possessed reciprocal
duties of care and trust for their Indian
wards. The tribes, he said, were neither
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independently sovereign nor inferior to
states but “domestic dependent nations”
whose inherent powers were not derived
from the United States, even if they could
be limited by that government.
Each time the court or country faced
changing circumstances—whether of
movement west or diminution of tribal
power in the face of disease and economic
blight—Congress was again tempted by a
comprehensive fix. So, in the 1870s, with
the rise of the reservation system, it was
thought that what every Indian really
wanted was 160 acres and a mule, and all
“surplus” land could then be opened for
white settlement. By the 1920s, when the
disastrous implications of this policy for
the health and well-being of Indians was
finally apparent, an Indian “New Deal”
allowed tribes a constitutional government—provided the constitution met
federal approval. And, when that was
thought to help produce an environment
in which every Indian would want the
government off his back and out of his
pocket, still new “termination” policies in
the post-World War II era sought to end
federal recognition altogether. Only in the
early 1970s was the present “self-determination” policy initiated, in which Indian
tribes may contract for many of their
federal services themselves.
In each of these instances, as Stephen
Brimley’s excellent analysis demonstrates,
Indians have not only adapted themselves
to changing policies but have had to
live with the uncertainty of wholesale
attempts by Congress, the courts, or the
states to reorganize their status all over
again. Since, like geologic strata, each
preceding policy still has continuing
effects, the uncertainties are only exaggerated. The result is an environment in
which, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
recently said, the law relating to Native
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Americans is all but incomprehensible
even to specialists. The ambivalence and
contradictions (as they appear to many
whites) in the “special status” of native
peoples is only intensified, and the fear
of a backlash to every advance is felt by
most Indians as a premonitory threat.
Two domains help illustrate this situation—jurisdiction on Indian lands, and the
role of states in taxing and regulating
Indian enterprises. Justice Holmes rightly
said that jurisdiction is power: To subject
another to your laws is both an assertion
of dominance and a vehicle for constructing one’s own sense of that which
needs to be protected. In the 1870s, the
Supreme Court had recognized that Indian
tribes had the inherent right to criminal
jurisdiction even over whites on their
reservations. Congress immediately limited
that power to certain major crimes, but
for many decades left intact jurisdiction
over non-Indians and whites committing
misdemeanors on Indian land. Once the
Reagan appointees took hold on the
Supreme Court, however, this power was
subject to diminution, so that today federally recognized tribes have very little
power over non-members on their lands.
Attempts by Congress to recognize this
inherent power have been dismissed by
the Court as beyond the power of that
legislative body. The result has been
twofold. On the one hand, it has led to
lawlessness in many areas, since states are
unwilling to pay the costs of enforcement
and tribes lack jurisdiction. At the same
time, however, this very lawlessness has
contributed to one of the most important
changes in Indian-white relations, namely
the proliferation of agreements (compacts)
between states and Indians for the resolution of a number of their points of conflict.
In the second domain, that of taxation and
regulation of Indian country, states have

been allowed to implement an unending
array of modes for taxing Indian enterprises in an attempt to reduce the Indians’
marketing of their “special status.” At the
same time, however, because of the underlying ambivalence of policies and attitudes,
the states and tribes have, when their individual interests merge, also moved toward
agreements forged in the shadow of law
and history alike.
Perhaps nothing has contributed
so much to the present situation as the
proliferation of eastern land claims cases
in the 1970s and the rise of casino
gambling on Indian lands in more recent
years. In an era of professed self-determination and ambivalent white guilt about
the past treatment of Indians, the land
cases made visible that settlement was
to be preferred to extensive litigation or
wholesale policy change. These cases,
particularly as exemplified by the Maine
case, set up the possibility for agreements.
But as in water rights or lease agreements
or fishing treaties, Indians, as the relatively weak party, have often had to
forego established legal rights in order
to get sufficient resources to live on.
They have often had to limit their claims
because of the hostility of the states,
the Rehnquist Court’s move away from
established principles of Indian law, and
the threat of backlash by localities or
Congress. Indians have had to agree to
settlements that, while seeming extravagant to those who (once again) cannot
understand why Indians should get
“special treatment,” have, in fact, further
eroded tribal sovereignty and economic
development. The difference, perhaps,
from other moments in American history
is that the Indians have, in some instances,
been able to acquire both the political
and the economic capital to enhance their
negotiating position.
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The rise of casino gambling has led
to an interesting situation with regard to
Indian-state relations. Even though the
Supreme Court has said that the Indian
gaming act cannot require states to give
up their sovereign immunity and be forced
to negotiate agreements with the Indians,
many states have, in fact, made such
compacts in order to tap the revenue that
tribal casinos generate. Together with the
forceful efforts on behalf of native peoples
by Senator Inouye and others in the past
decade, the Indians have gained considerable experience in negotiating their way
through legislative bodies and at the
bargaining table. However, since relatively
few tribes have benefited from gambling,
and notwithstanding the willingness of
some states to negotiate with their Indian
citizens, the relationship remains one that
appears to many state residents and their
representatives as somehow illogical, if not
politically unnatural.
The fear in Indian country now runs
to several possibilities. Some members
of the Supreme Court, in their opinions
in recent Indian cases, appear ready to
extend their general program of returning
a great deal of power to the states by
actually limiting the powers of Congress
itself to those that are explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. Having used
Indian cases—whether they concerned
religion or gambling or jurisdiction—as
stalking horses for larger Constitutional
reform, the Court may now try to limit
congressional power through cases that
have an especial impact on Indians.
Similarly, the fear is that any gain in negotiations may yield arrangements that, as
circumstances change, leave the Indians
with few options for adaptation. Forced
by need to give up still more of their
powers of sovereignty, tribes understandably fear the concomitant loss of control
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over their own destinies as circumstances
change. The result would be consistent
with the past: renewed ambivalence on
the part of whites, who cannot understand why a deal once made should still
imply that treaties are valid or that one
can be quasisovereign in ways other than
that which applies to states or municipalities; the potential for a backlash whenever
Indians seem to be able to avail themselves of legal or political possibilities
that do not apply to any other groups;
and the fear that American intolerance
for ambiguity may settle on the tribes as
a convenient target of opportunity.
The key to Indian-white relations
undoubtedly lies in the willingness of
American society as a whole to embrace
differentness for what it is—to recognize
that everything does not have to fit one
religious or political or social mold,
that the Indian is the supreme test of
America’s commitment to its claimed
principles, and that the way in which
America answers that test will in the
future, as it has in the past, be the final
arbiter of the claims we make about our
society and our professed beliefs. Tribes
need to find better terms by which to
articulate their distinctive status and the
reasons behind it, despite enormous
changes, and white America must keep its
integrity by keeping its word. States and
their white citizens need to have a clearer
appreciation of the dependent position
in which the tribes have been placed and
the difficulties of living with policies that
are subject to the vicissitudes of legislative
enactment and fluctuating public opinion.
In the full light of history, and with the
common goal of making the nation safe
for difference, we may yet recapture our
mutual ability to negotiate in good faith
and thereby reproduce good faith. 
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